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Abstract 
We use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally different contests 
can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response 
functions and, as a result, the same efforts. Two strategically equivalent contests, however, may 
yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify 
strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically 
equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent 
contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future 
theoretical and empirical research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications: C72, D72, D74 
Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, equivalence, contest design  
 
Corresponding author: Roman M. Sheremeta; E-mail: sheremet@chapman.edu  
* The earlier version of this paper circulated under the title “The Equivalence of Contests.” We have benefitted from 
the helpful comments of Kyung Hwan Baik, Tim Cason, Subir Chakrabarti, Dan Kovenock, Sanghack Lee, John 
Lopresti, Stephen Martin, Ted Turocy, seminar participants at Indian Statistical Institute Calcutta, IUPUI, Kookmin 
University, Purdue University, the University of East Anglia and participants at the 2008 Midwest Economic Theory 
Meetings. The usual disclaimers apply.  
 2
1. Introduction 
A contest is a game in which players expend costly resources, such as effort, money or 
time, in order to win a prize. Since the seminal papers of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen 
(1981), many different contests have been introduced to the literature. For example, Skaperdas 
(1992) study contests where the final payoff depends on the residual resources and the prize. 
Chung (1996) and Kaplan et al. (2002) examine contests with effort-dependent prizes. Lee and 
Kang (1998) and Baye et al. (2005) study contests with rank-order spillovers. Although these 
contests are intuitively and structurally very different, they often share common links. 
There are several studies that establish common links between different contests. For 
example, Che and Gale (2000) provide a link between a rank-order tournament of Lazear and 
Rosen (1981) and an all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989). Baye et al. (2012) show the 
connection between the all-pay auction and pricing games (Varian, 1980; Rosenthal, 1980). 
Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) show how an R&D race between two players which is modeled as a 
rank-order tournament is equivalent to a rent-seeking contest.1 Baye and Hoppe (2003) identify 
conditions under which research tournament models (Fullerton and McAfee, 1999) and patent 
race models (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980) are strategically equivalent to the rent-seeking contest. 
These duality results permit one to apply results derived in the rent-seeking contest literature to 
the innovation, patent race, and rank-order tournament models, and vice versa. 
In this paper we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be 
strategically and effort equivalent. We consider a two-player Tullock-type contest, where 
outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. 
                                                 
1 Jia (2008) extends the result by proving a more general equivalence between a rank-order tournament and a rent-
seeking contest. Fu and Lu (2012) shows that the rent-seeking contest can further include auctions with pre-
investment (Tan, 1992). Similarly, Sheremeta et al. (2012) links the rent-seeking contest to a proportional-prize 
contest. Chowdhury (2009) demonstrates the connection between all-pay auctions (Siegel, 2009) and capacity-
constrained price contests (Osborne and Pitchik, 1986; Deneckere and Kovenock, 1996). 
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Under this structure, we identify strategically equivalent contests that generate the same best 
response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, the strategically 
equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. 
It is important to emphasize that the aforementioned studies establish links between 
different families of contests, such as all-pay auctions, rent-seeking contests, and rank-order 
tournaments. The main result of this paper is conceptually very different from the findings of the 
previous studies. In particular, we show that even within the same family of Tullock-type 
contests, different types of contests might produce the same best response functions and the same 
equilibrium efforts (although not necessarily the same payoffs). 
This is an important finding for a number of reasons. First, there exists a substantial 
literature modeling the rules of the contest as an endogenous choice of a contest designer 
(Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Epstein and Nitzan, 2006; Corchón and Dahm, 2011; Polishchuk and 
Tonis, 2012). A contest designer can choose the parameters of the model to maximize the total 
rent dissipation (as in the case of rent-seeking), or maximize the equilibrium highest effort (as in 
R&D races), or minimize the total equilibrium effort (as in electoral races), or simply to enhance 
public welfare. Our results demonstrate that it is possible for a contest designer to achieve 
different goals using strategically equivalent contests. For example, the contest designer seeking 
Pareto improvement may choose a contest that generates the same equilibrium efforts, incurs the 
same costs, but results in higher expected payoffs for contestants. Finally, certain contests may 
not be feasible to implement in the field due to regulatory restrictions, or due to the possibility of 
collusion among contestants. However, such restrictions may not apply to other strategically 
equivalent contests. 
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2. The Model 
Following Baye et al. (2005, 2012) and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a, 2011b), we 
consider a two-player contest with two prizes. The players, denoted by ݅ and ݆, value the winning 
and the losing prizes as ܹ ൐ 0  and ܮ א Թ , with ܹ ൐ ܮ . Players simultaneously and 
independently expend efforts ݔ௜ ൒ 0 and ݔ௝ ൒ 0. The probability of player ݅ winning the contest 
is defined by a lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980): 
 ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ൌ ൜ݔ௜/ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݔ௝ሻ     if  ݔ௜ ൅ ݔ௝ ് 01/2                     if  ݔ௜ ൌ ݔ௝ ൌ 0      (1) 
Contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff for player ݅ is a linear function of prizes, 
own effort, and the effort of the rival: 
ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ൌ ቊܹ ൅ ߙଵݔ௜ ൅ ߚଵݔ௝           with probability          ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻܮ ൅ ߙଶݔ௜ ൅ ߚଶݔ௝             with probability  1 െ ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ  (2) 
where ߙଵ , ߙଶ  are cost parameters (ߙଵ ൏ 0, ߙଶ ൑ 0), and ߚଵ , ߚଶ  are spillover parameters. We 
define the contest described by (1) and (2) as Γሺ݅, ݆, Ωሻ, where Ω ൌ ሼܹ, ܮ, ߙଵ, ߙଶ, ߚଵ, ߚଶሽ is a set 
of parameters. All parameters in Ω and the contest success function are common knowledge. The 
players are risk neutral, therefore the expected payoff for player ݅ is 
ܧ൫ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ൯ ൌ ௫೔௫೔ା௫ೕ ൫ܹ ൅ ߙଵݔ௜ ൅ ߚଵݔ௝൯ ൅
௫ೕ
௫೔ା௫ೕ ൫ܮ ൅ ߙଶݔ௜ ൅ ߚଶݔ௝൯   (3) 
where ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ് ሺ0,0ሻ. For ݔ௜ ൌ ݔ௝ ൌ 0, the expected payoff is ܧ൫ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ൯ ൌ ሺܹ ൅ ܮሻ/2.  
Player ݅’s best response is derived by maximizing ܧ൫ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ൯ with respect to ݔ௜: 
ݔ௜஻ோி ൌ െݔ௝ ൅ ට
ሼሺఈభିఈమሻିሺఉభିఉమሻሽ௫ೕమିሼௐି௅ሽ௫ೕ
ఈభ       (4) 
Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) show that although the payoff function (3) is not 
globally concave, the first order condition and the resulting best response function (4) are 
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sufficient for an equilibrium to exist. Moreover, under the appropriate restrictions, i.e., ሺߚଶ െ
ߙଵሻ ൒ 0 and െሺ3ߙଵ ൅ ߙଶሻ െ ሺߚଵ െ ߚଶሻ ൐ 0, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium defined by: 
ݔ௜כ ൌ ݔ௝כ ൌ ݔ ൌ ሺௐି௅ሻିሺଷఈభାఈమሻିሺఉభିఉమሻ.       (5) 
Given the symmetric equilibrium (5), the equilibrium payoff is 
ܧכሺߨሻ ൌ ሺఉమିఈభሻሺௐି௅ሻିሺଷఈభାఈమሻିሺఉభିఉమሻ ൅ ܮ.        (6) 
The contest Γሺ݅, ݆, Ωሻ, defined by (1) and (2), may also generate asymmetric equilibria. 
Since in the current study we focus only on the symmetric equilibrium, we impose further 
restriction ሺ5ߙଵ െ ߙଶሻ െ ሺߚଵ െ ߚଶሻ ൐ 0 , derived by Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011b), to 
guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
 
3. Equivalent Contests 
In this section, we define strategically equivalent contests and show the required 
parametric restrictions to obtain the equivalence. We start by providing a definition of strategic 
equivalence. 
Definition 1: Contests are strategically equivalent if they generate the same best response 
functions. 
This definition of strategic equivalence of contests is different from the one used by Baye 
and Hoppe (2003). According to their definition, games are strategically equivalent when they 
generate the same expected payoff functions, and thus the same equilibrium payoffs. Here, we 
use a less strict definition of strategic equivalence, namely equivalence of the best response 
functions. It is usually the case in the contest design literature that a contest designer chooses the 
rules of the contest to induce a specific behavior of contestants (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Epstein 
and Nitzan, 2006; Corchón and Dahm, 2011; Polishchuk and Tonis, 2012). The contest designer 
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is often indifferent towards the resulting payoffs of contestants. Thus, it seems appropriate to 
have a less restrictive definition of strategic equivalence that mainly relates to strategic behavior 
of contestants and not their payoffs. Nevertheless, one could use a more restrictive definition of 
strategic equivalence that also requires the equivalence of payoffs (see the Definition 3 below). 
Moreover, a number of contests described in this paper are both strategically and payoff 
equivalent. 
To demonstrate strategic equivalence, let us consider two contests Γ஺ሺ݅, ݆, Ω஺ሻ  and 
Γ஻ሺ݅, ݆, Ω஻ሻ, where Ω௞ ൌ ሼܹ௞, ܮ௞, ߙଵ௞, ߙଶ௞, ߚଵ௞, ߚଶ௞ሽ for ݇ ൌ ܣ, ܤ. From equation (4), the sufficient 
conditions for contests Γ஺ሺ݅, ݆, Ω஺ሻ and Γ஻ሺ݅, ݆, Ω஻ሻ to be strategically equivalent, i.e., to have the 
same best response functions, are the following: 
൫ఈభಲିఈమಲ൯ି൫ఉభಲିఉమಲ൯
ఈభಲ ൌ
൫ఈభಳିఈమಳ൯ି൫ఉభಳିఉమಳ൯
ఈభಳ   and   
൫ௐಲି௅ಲ൯
ఈభಲ ൌ
൫ௐಳି௅ಳ൯
ఈభಳ .   (7) 
Next, we define effort equivalent contests. 
Definition 2: Contests are effort equivalent if they result in the same equilibrium efforts. 
From equation (5), the sufficient condition for contests Γ஺ሺ݅, ݆, Ω஺ሻ and Γ஻ሺ݅, ݆, Ω஻ሻ to be 
effort equivalent is the following: 
ሺௐಲି௅ಲሻ
ି൫ଷఈభಲାఈమಲ൯ି൫ఉభಲିఉమಲ൯ ൌ
ሺௐಳି௅ಳሻ
ି൫ଷఈభಳାఈమಳ൯ି൫ఉభಳିఉమಳ൯.      (8) 
Generally, strategic equivalence is a stronger condition than effort equivalence because it 
requires different contests to generate exactly the same best response functions, and as a 
consequence the same equilibrium efforts. However, given that in our analysis we impose 
restrictions to guarantee that only the unique and symmetric equilibrium (5) exists, strategic 
equivalence implies effort equivalence and vice versa. It is also important to emphasize that 
without spillovers, effort equivalence is the same as the revenue equivalence, since revenue of a 
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contest designer is simply the sum of all individual efforts (Baron and Myerson, 1982; 
Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).2 
In addition to strategic and effort equivalence, we also define payoff equivalent contests. 
Definition 3: Contests are payoff equivalent if they generate the same expected payoffs. 
From equation (6), the sufficient condition for contests Γ஺ሺ݅, ݆, Ω஺ሻ and Γ஻ሺ݅, ݆, Ω஻ሻ to be 
payoff equivalent, i.e., to generate the same equilibrium payoffs, is the following: 
൫ఉమಲିఈభಲ൯൫ௐಲି௅ಲ൯
ି൫ଷఈభಲାఈమಲ൯ି൫ఉభಲିఉమಲ൯ ൅ ܮ
஺ ൌ ൫ఉమಳିఈభಳ൯൫ௐಳି௅ಳ൯ି൫ଷఈభಳାఈమಳ൯ି൫ఉభಳିఉమಳ൯ ൅ ܮ
஻.     (9) 
It is easy to verify that strategic equivalence does not automatically imply payoff 
equivalence. As we show in the next section, depending on the cost and spillover parameters in 
Ω, one strategically equivalent contest can generate higher payoff than another. Nevertheless, 
most contests that we discuss are strategically, effort and payoff equivalent.  
Finally, to simplify our analysis we assume that all alternative contests have the same 
winning prize and the same losing prize, i.e., ܹ ஺ ൌ ܹ஻ ൌ ܹ  and ܮ஺ ൌ ܮ஻ ൌ ܮ . This 
assumption is intuitive given that the contest designer usually has specific pre-defined prizes 
which he can use to design a contest. Given this assumption, strategic and effort equivalence 
conditions (8) and (9) are simplified to the following condition: 
ߚଶ஺ െ ߚଵ஺ െ ߙଶ஺ ൌ ߚଶ஻ െ ߚଵ஻ െ ߙଶ஻  and   ߙଵ஺ ൌ ߙଵ஻.     (10) 
In the rest of the paper, we follow a simple two-step procedure to find strategically 
equivalent contests to a particular baseline contest. First, we derive the best response function of 
the baseline contest as in equation (4). Second, from the best response function of the baseline 
                                                 
2 In contests with spillovers there are different ways to define revenue, and thus effort equivalence may not imply 
revenue equivalence. For example, revenue can be defined as the sum of individual efforts and both positive and 
negative spillovers, or as the sum of efforts and only positive spillovers. Such alternative definitions of revenue 
would require different conditions for revenue equivalence. In this paper, however, we focus only on effort 
equivalence since eliciting individual efforts is usually the main objective of a contest designer. 
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contest we derive the restrictions needed, as in (10), for a more general family of contests to 
generate the same best response functions. This simple procedure is used throughout our 
analysis. We begin with the original contest of Tullock (1980) as the baseline contest. 
 
3.1. Original Tullock Contest 
In the standard rent-seeking contest, introduced by Tullock (1980), there is no losing 
prize and regardless of the outcome of the contest, both players forgo their efforts. In such a case, 
the winning prize value ܹ ൐ 0, ߙଵ ൌ ߙଶ ൌ െ1, and the other parameters in Ω are zero. The 
payoff for player ݅ in case of winning or losing is 
ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ൌ ቊܹ െ ݔ௜                           with probability           ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻെݔ௜                                 with probability  1 െ ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ   (11) 
Using our notation, the Tullock contest is defined as Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1, െ1,0,0ሽሻ . The 
resulting best response function in such a contest for player ݅ is 
ݔ௜ ൌ െݔ௝ ൅ ඥܹݔ௝.          (12) 
For a generic contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, ܮ, ߙଵ, ߙଶ, ߚଵ, ߚଶሽሻ to be strategically equivalent to contest  
Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1, െ1,0,0ሽሻ , according to condition (10), we need to impose the following 
restrictions: ߚଶ െ ߚଵ െ ߙଶ ൌ 1 , ߙଵ ൌ െ1  and ܮ ൌ 0 . Such restrictions guarantee that the best 
response function (4) is exactly the same as the best response function (12). Therefore, by 
definition these contests are strategically equivalent. 
One particularly interesting case arises when we put further restrictions ߚଵ ൌ െ1 and 
ߙଶ ൌ ߚଶ ൌ 0. In such a contest, Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1,0, െ1,0ሽሻ, the new payoff function is:  
ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ൌ ቊܹ െ ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝                with probability           ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ0                                    with probability  1 െ ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ    (13) 
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Note that in (13), the winner fully reimburses the loser. This can be interpreted as the 
‘Marshall system of litigation’ (Baye et al., 2005) in which the winner pays his own legal costs 
and also reimburses all of the legal costs of the loser, whereas the standard Tullock contest can 
be interpreted as the ‘American system of litigation’ in which each litigant pays its own legal 
expenses.3 It can easily be shown that the unique equilibrium for contests defined by (11) and 
(13) is the symmetric equilibrium with ݔ௜כ ൌ ݔ௝כ ൌ ܹ/4. Moreover, the expected payoff in both 
contests is exactly the same, ܧכሺߨሻ ൌ ܹ/4. Therefore, contests (11) and (13) are strategically, 
effort and payoff equivalent. This equivalence is surprising, since the two contests are intuitively 
and structurally very different. However, it has been also shown in an all-pay auction setting 
under incomplete information (Baye et al., 2005). Therefore, our results provide further evidence 
that Marshall and American systems of litigation are revenue (in our case, effort) and payoff 
equivalent.  
It is also straightforward to show that the ‘input spillover’ contest of Chowdhury and 
Sheremeta (2011a) and Baye et al. (2012), where the effort expended by player j partially affects 
player ݅ and vice versa, is strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest. The spillover 
contest can be defined as Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1, െ1, ߚ, ߚሽሻ, where ߚ א ሺെ1,1ሻ is the input spillover 
parameter. This type of contest is motivated by spillover effects in R&D innovation 
(D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992). From strategic equivalence condition 
(10), one can see that for any value of ߚ, the resulting best response function is exactly same as 
in (11). Hence, the input spillover contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1, െ1, ߚ, ߚሽሻ is strategically equivalent 
to the original Tullock contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1, െ1,0,0ሽሻ. This result suggests that if an R&D 
competition is modeled as a lottery contest, then the existence of symmetric spillovers may not 
                                                 
3 Also see Matros and Armanios (2009) and Yates (2011) for further examples of this type of contests. 
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affect the equilibrium. However, the ‘input spillover’ contest is not payoff equivalent to the 
original Tullock contest, since condition (9) is not satisfied. It can be easily shown that a positive 
(negative) spillover provides a higher (lower) payoff to the players than the Tullock contest. 
 
3.2. Modified Tullock-Type Contests 
Researchers often use modified versions of the original Tullock contests in order to 
address specific questions such as taxes, subsidies, externalities, effort dependent valuations, cost 
differences, etc. There are instances in the literature where two different Tullock-type contests 
are strategically equivalent to each other. Here we briefly discuss some of these examples.  
Chung (1996) assumes that the value of the winning prize depends on the total effort 
expenditures in the contest. A simple linear version of the Chung (1996) model would generate 
the following payoff function: 
ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ൌ ቊܹ ൅ ܽሺݔ௜ ൅ ݔ௝ሻ െ ݔ௜        with probability           ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ െ ݔ௜                                      with probability  1 െ ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ  (14) 
Hence, (14) can be described as Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, ܽ െ 1, െ1, ܽ, 0ሽሻ, where ܽ א ሺ0,1ሻ, and the best 
response function is 
 ݔ௜ ൌ െݔ௝ ൅ ඥܹݔ௝/ሺ1 െ ܽሻ        (15) 
Lee and Kang (1998) study a contest with externalities. In their model the cost of effort 
decreases with the total effort expenditures. This contest can be captured by 
ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ൌ ቊܹ െ ݔ௜ ൅ ܾሺݔ௜ ൅ ݔ௝ሻ              with probability           ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻെݔ௜ ൅ ܾሺݔ௜ ൅ ݔ௝ሻ                    with probability  1 െ ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ   (16) 
Hence, (16) can be described as Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, ܾ െ 1, ܾ െ 1, ܾ, ܾሽሻ, where ܾ א ሺ0,1ሻ, and the best 
response function is 
ݔ௜ ൌ െݔ௝ ൅ ඥܹݔ௝/ሺ1 െ ܾሻ        (17) 
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When ܽ ൌ ܾ  the best response functions (15) and (17) and the equilibrium effort 
expenditures in the two contests are exactly the same. This result indicates that some contests 
with endogenous prizes, as in Chung (1996), are strategically equivalent to contests with 
externalities, as in Lee and Kang (1998). Also note that, although both contests are strategically 
equivalent, they are not payoff equivalent. In particular, the contest defined by (16) results in 
higher expected payoff than the contest defined by (14), providing a clear Pareto ranking 
between the two contests. Hence, a benevolent contest designer, such as the government trying to 
maximize the total social welfare, may opt to choose a contest that elicits the same level of 
expenditures and, at the same time, results in Pareto improvement for both contestants. 
Next, we consider a ‘limited liability’ contest introduced by Skaperdas and Gan (1995), 
where the loser’s payoff is independent of the efforts expended.4 The authors motivate this 
example by stating that contestants may be entrepreneurs who borrow money to spend on 
research and development and thus are not legally responsible in case of a loss. The loser of such 
a contest is unable to repay the loan and goes bankrupt. In such a case, ܹ ൐ 0, ߙଵ ൌ െ1, and the 
other parameters in Ω are zero. The payoff is: 
ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ൌ ቊܹ െ ݔ௜                           with probability           ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ0                                      with probability  1 െ ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ   (18) 
The best response function for player ݅ is: 
ݔ௜ ൌ െݔ௝ ൅ ටݔ௝ଶ ൅ ܹݔ௝         (19) 
For a contest to be strategically equivalent to Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1,0,0,0ሽሻ  the required 
restrictions from (10) are ߚଶ െ ߚଵ െ ߙଶ ൌ 0 , ߙଵ ൌ െ1  and ܮ ൌ 0 . When we impose further 
                                                 
4 Example of these kinds of contests can also be found in Matros and Armanios (2009). 
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restrictions ߙଶ ൌ െ1 , ߚଶ ൌ െ1  and ߚଵ ൌ 0  we obtain a contest with the following payoff 
function: 
ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ ൌ ቊܹ െ ݔ௜                          with probability           ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻെݔ௜ െ ݔ௝                       with probability  1 െ ݌௜ሺݔ௜, ݔ௝ሻ    (20) 
This contest can be interpreted as a ‘full liability’ contest, since the loser has to pay in full 
the expenditures of both players. Note that although (18) is strategically equivalent to (20), the 
‘full liability’ contest is (by definition) more risky than the ‘limited liability’ contest. In (18) 
players do not have to worry about what happens in the case of a loss, since they are not legally 
responsible. In contrast, the loser in (20) has to pay the expenditures of both players. Therefore, 
equivalence between (18) and (20) holds only under the assumption of risk neutrality. Moreover, 
it is easy to verify from (9) that contests (18) and (20) are not payoff equivalent. The equilibrium 
payoff in the ‘full liability’ contest is ܧכሺߨሻ ൌ 0  and in the ‘limited liability’ contest it is 
ܧכሺߨሻ ൌ ܹ/3. 
Alexeev and Leitzel (1996) study a ‘rent-shrinking’ contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1, െ1, െ1,0ሽሻ, 
where the winning prize value decreases by the total effort expenditures. From (10), a 
strategically equivalent contest would require ߚଶ െ ߚଵ െ ߙଶ ൌ 2, ߙଵ ൌ െ1 and ܮ ൌ 0. A ‘lazy 
winner’ contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െ1, െ2,0,0ሽሻ of Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a), in which the 
marginal cost of winning (ߙଵ ൌ െ1) is lower than the marginal cost of losing (ߙଶ ൌ െ2), 
definitely satisfies these restrictions. Moreover, the two contests are also payoff equivalent. The 
equivalence between the ‘rent-shrinking’ and ‘lazy winner’ contests enables the designer to 
achieve the same equilibrium rent dissipation using two alternative contests. Nevertheless, the 
‘lazy winner’ contest is, arguably, easier to implement and it is less susceptible to the collusion 
problem mentioned in Alexeev and Leitzel (1996). 
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In many cases a contest designer can use different policy tools to implement a certain 
contest. Using the same procedure as before it can be shown that under certain restrictions, 
contests with endogenous valuations (Amegashie, 1999), contests with differential cost structure 
(Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011a), and contests with taxes (Glazer and Konrad, 1999), are 
strategically equivalent. Specifically, Glazer and Konrad (1999) study a contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼሺ1 െ
ݐݓ,0,െ1െݐ,െ1,0,0ሻ, in which a part of the rent seeker’s non-negative profit is taxed with tax rate 
ݐ א ሺ0,1ሻ. Amegashie (1999) studies a contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, െሺ1 െ ݉ሻ, െ1,0,0ሽሻ, in which the 
winner’s prize value is a linear function of own effort spent. Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) 
study the ‘lazy winner’ contest Γሺ݅, ݆, ሼܹ, 0, ߙଵ, ߙଶ, 0,0ሽሻ, in which the marginal cost of winning 
is lower than the marginal cost of losing, i.e., |ߙଵ| ൏ |ߙଶ|. Using condition (7), when ሺ1 െ ݐሻݓ ൌ
ܹ,  ߙଵ െ ߙଶ ൌ ݐ ൌ ݉, and ߙଵ ൌ ሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൌ ሺ݉ െ 1ሻ then the three contests are strategically and 
effort equivalent. 
The equivalence between these three seemingly unrelated contests conveys an important 
message. It shows that the designer can either use policy tools, such as taxes, or contests with 
alternative cost structure to achieve the same objective. Moreover, the three contests do not 
necessarily generate the same equilibrium payoffs. The equilibrium payoff (under the restriction 
of strategic equivalence) in Glazer and Konrad (1999) is ܧכሺߨሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݐሻଶW/ሺ4 െ 3ݐሻ , in 
Amegashie (1999) it is ܧכሺߨሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݐሻܹ/ሺ4 െ 3ݐሻ, and in Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) 
it is ܧכሺߨሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݐሻW/ሺ2 െ 3ݐሻ. Hence, a contest designer, such as a government trying to 
maximize the social welfare, can achieve a Pareto improvement by choosing a specific contest 
structure that generates the highest payoffs for players yet results in the same equilibrium efforts. 
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4. Discussion 
In this paper we use a Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and structurally 
different contests can be strategically equivalent. We define strategically equivalent contests as 
contests that generate the same best response functions. Under the assumption of a unique 
equilibrium, strategically equivalent contest are also effort equivalent. However, strategically 
equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs, and thus may not be payoff 
equivalent. We describe a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. 
Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock 
contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. 
We reestablish some existing results derived under alternative contest success functions 
and incomplete information, i.e., the equivalence of the American and Marshall systems of 
litigation. We also introduce new results, such as the equivalence between a standard Tullock 
contest and an input spillover contest, as well as the equivalence of a number of Tullock-type 
contests with endogenous valuations, spillovers, and differential cost structures. 
Our findings contribute to the contest design literature by demonstrating how different 
strategically equivalent contests can be used to achieve the same objectives. A contest designer 
may choose to maximize the total rent dissipation, minimize equilibrium efforts, or simply 
enhance public welfare. Our results demonstrate that the contest designer can achieve these 
objectives by imposing appropriate restrictions on contest parameters. For example, we show 
that the two strategically and effort equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. 
Hence, a contest designer seeking Pareto improvement may choose a contest that generates the 
same efforts, incurs the same costs, but results in higher expected payoffs for contestants. 
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It is important to understand the critical conditions required for the equivalence to hold in 
the field. Following the majority of the rent-seeking contests in the literature, we consider a two-
player Tullock-type contest with linear cost and spillover structure under risk neutrality. The 
strategic equivalence results may not hold if we relax one or more of these assumptions to 
incorporate behavioral factors that can influence individual decisions but are not modeled in the 
current setting. For example, it has been shown in laboratory settings that contestants make 
mistakes (Sheremeta, 2011; Lim et al., 2012), have incorrect judgments (Parco et al., 2005; 
Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009), exhibit non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010; Price 
and Sheremeta, 2011) and are usually risk averse (Millner and Pratt, 1991; Sheremeta and 
Zhang, 2010; Sheremeta, 2011). 5  Some of these factors may distort individual behavior in 
strategically equivalent contests, and thus may break such equivalence. Finally, there are 
practical applications in which costs are convex (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001) and spillovers 
influence the payoff function in a non-linearly manner (Kräkel, 2004). A different analysis of 
equivalence would be required in such cases. Nevertheless, the concept of strategic equivalence 
and the two-step procedure to obtain strategically equivalent contests would be still relevant for 
such analyses. Using the two-step procedure one could, for example, find equivalence conditions 
with more than two players, risk aversion, and non-linear cost/spillover structure. Such analyses 
as well as the empirical tests of the equivalence in the laboratory are kept for future research. 
  
                                                 
5 For an extensive review of the experimental literature on contests see Dechenaux et al. (2012). 
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